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Abstract
Modelling ethics is critical to understanding and
analysing social phenomena. However, prior lit-
erature either incorporates ethics into agent strate-
gies or uses it for evaluation of agent behaviour.
This work proposes a framework that models both,
ethical decision making as well as evaluation us-
ing virtue ethics and utilitarianism. In an itera-
tion, agents can use either the classical Continu-
ous Prisoner’s Dilemma or a new type of interac-
tion called moral interaction, where agents donate
or steal from other agents. We introduce moral in-
teractions to model ethical decision making. We
also propose a novel agent type, called virtue agent,
parametrised by the agent’s level of ethics. Virtue
agents’ decisions are based on moral evaluations of
past interactions. Our simulations show that uneth-
ical agents make short term gains but are less pros-
perous in the long run. We find that in societies
with positivity bias, unethical agents have high in-
centive to become ethical. The opposite is true of
societies with negativity bias. We also evaluate the
ethicality of existing strategies and compare them
with those of virtue agents.
1 Introduction
Philosophers have enquired into the moral underpinnings of
human conduct since the ancient Greek era [Rogers, 1937].
The study of ethics deals with the very definition of right and
wrong, and the formulation and application of principles that
define behaviour affecting other living organisms. Normative
ethics is the branch of ethics that discusses when an action
is right or wrong and the questions that arise when one per-
forms an action. Normative ethical theories can be divided
into three categories: Kantian, consequentialism, and virtue
ethics [van Roojen, 2001]. Kantian or deontological ethics
evaluate an action based on a set of moral rules (deontology)
rather than the consequences of the action. On the other hand,
consequentialism emphasises the effects (consequences) of
actions. An action that increases or brings about something
that is considered ‘good’ by the ethical theory, is deemed to
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be morally acceptable [Alexander and Moore, 2016]. Virtue
ethics emphasises the inherent moral character (virtue) of ac-
tions. While all three approaches accommodate virtue, con-
sequences and rules, they differ in what they consider to be
fundamental [Hursthouse and Pettigrove, 2018].
Modelling ethics provides insights into the relationships
between macro-properties of society and the corresponding
ethical theory, in addition to augmenting our toolkit for mod-
elling social phenomena [Doloswala, 2014; Korb et al., 2010;
Lim et al., 2008]. One of the first instances of combining
computer simulations with ethics was the work of Daniel-
son [1992], who coined the term ‘artificial morality’ and in-
troduced moral agents in an attempt to improve performance
in games like the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Ethics can be used to perform a moral evaluation of agent
behaviour and simulations [Korb et al., 2010; Cointe et al.,
2016; Wang et al., 2017]. For example, Korb et al. [2010]
simulate evolving worlds where agents can pass on traits to
the next generation and evaluate the effects of altruism, rape
and abortion using utilitarianism, a type of consequentialist
ethics. Ethics can also be used to constrain the behaviour of
agents to make ethical decisions [Wiegel and van den Berg,
2009; Gaudou et al., 2014]. Lasquety-Reyes [2018] details
approaches to incorporate popular ethical theories like utili-
tarianism, feminist care ethics, Kantian ethics, etc., in agent-
based models.
There are efforts focused on the study of ethics in artifi-
cial intelligence [Bostrom and Yudkowsky, 2014], on how AI
systems should be designed for morality [Boyles, 2017], and
on ideas for moral evaluation of machine actions [Wallach,
2010]. However, our approach for understanding the effects
of ethics in society is unique and has not been directly antici-
pated.
This work considers both ethical decision-making as well
as evaluation of the same. We also introduce a new agent
type, called a virtue agent, which can be used to instantiate
agents with different levels of ethics. Through simulations,
we analyse the relationship between ethics, prosperity and
society. We find that unethical agents make short-term gains
but are worse off in the long run. Moreover, the prosperity of
agents increases steeply with their level of ethics. Our simula-
tions indicate that societies with positivity bias (societies that
emphasise rewarding ethical actions more than penalising un-
ethical ones) lead to convergent trends where unethical agents
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have high incentive to become ethical and ethical agents have
incentive to maintain their position. The opposite is true for
societies with negativity bias, where unethical agents might
become more unethical for short term gains. We also evaluate
the ethicality of existing CPD strategies and compare them to
those of virtue agents.
In an iteration in our model, agents can use either the
classical Continuous Prisoner’s Dilemma (CPD) [Killingback
and Doebeli, 2002; Verhoeff, 1993] or a new type of inter-
action called a moral interaction. The latter is introduced
to model ethical decision-making and provides agents with
the opportunity to either steal from or donate to other agents.
The prosperity of agents is captured through a resource pa-
rameter which is updated through the CPD payoffs and moral
interactions. Agents also maintain an opinion value of other
agents in the simulation and update it post-interaction. These
opinion updates are modelled after the principles of virtue
ethics and utilitarianism. Moral interactions are followed by
a broadcast of the details of the interaction to a large fraction
of agents in the simulation to model the spread of informa-
tion about beneficent and maleficent actions in the real world.
The agents receiving the broadcast update their opinions after
evaluating the ethicality of the interaction.
Virtue agents are parameterised by the agent’s level of
ethics. They serve as a powerful and flexible tool to instanti-
ate populations with varying levels of ethics. The framework
is modular in the sense that one can include virtue agents
along with other classical agent types.
2 Framework
We use a cellular automaton model where agents are repre-
sented as cells on a grid. The set of all agents Ai is de-
noted by A. In a simulation, the agents participate in iterated
interactions with their Moore neighbours of range 1 [Weis-
stein, 2005]. An agent Ai’s Moore neighbours are denoted
by N (Ai). Specifically, an iteration consists of every agent
Ai interacting with a randomly-chosen Aj 2 N (Ai). We
refer to a pair of interacting agents as A0 and A1, and other
agents in the simulation as Aj .
The interactions themselves are governed by a combina-
tion of agent and model parameters, some of which are static
while others may change post interaction. Central to the inter-
actions are the opinion and resource parameters. Every agent
A0 maintains an opinion about every other agent A1 in the
simulation, denoted by 	A0(A1) where 0  	A0(A1)  1.
We use A0’s opinion about A1 as A0’s perception of A1’s
ethicality. The average opinion about A0 across all agents is
computed as shown in (1) and is used as the reputation of
A0. P
x2AnfA0g	x(A0)
jAj   1 (1)
Every agent is also associated with a resource parameter.
An agent A0’s resource is an integer denoted by rA0 and is
initialized with the same value for all agents at the start of the
simulation. The resource is then updated based on agent in-
teractions. We interpret rA0 asA0’s prosperity in the society.
Agents can use two types of interactions, either the Contin-
uous Prisoner’s Dilemma (CPD) or a moral interaction, each
of which has been described in further detail in Sections 2.1
and 2.2 respectively. The behaviour of an agent in both types
of interactions is determined by its strategy. In an iteration, an
agent chooses a moral interaction over CPD with a probabil-
ity . In addition to ethical decision making, our framework
also provides a way to evaluate the ethicality of agent actions
as discussed in Section 2.3. The model parameters are sum-
marised in Table 1.
2.1 Continuous Prisoner’s Dilemma
The well known Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) involves two
agents choosing among two possible options, cooperate or
defect, which in turn affects the payoffs each agent re-
ceives. This game played repeatedly over multiple iterations
is known as the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) [Axelrod
and Hamilton, 1981] and allows agents to make choices based
on previous interactions. However, both games are discrete in
nature, and thus are unsuitable to model more complex sce-
narios.
The Continuous Prisoner’s Dilemma (CPD) [Killingback
and Doebeli, 2002; Verhoeff, 1993] overcomes this drawback
by allowing agents to choose any level of cooperation be-
tween 0 (complete defection) and 1 (complete cooperation).
Consider two agents A0 and A1 with cooperation levels c0
and c1 respectively. Their payoffs are a linear interpolation
between the discrete game payoffs as shown in (2) [Verhoeff,
1993].
pA0(c0; c1) = c0c1R+ c0 c1S + c0c1T + c0 c1P
pA1(c0; c1) = c1c0R+ c1 c0S + c1c0T + c1 c0P (2)
where: x = 1  x
R; S; T; P in (2) are the discrete payoffs in the standard PD
as shown below.
Agent A0
Agent A1
1 0
1 (R;R) (S; T )
0 (T; S) (P; P )
Iterated games require 2R > T +S and T > R > P > S.
We use the donation game variant of the payoff matrix where
R = (   ); T = ; S =   and P = 0 for any two
positive integers  >  [Hilbe et al., 2013]. In our frame-
work, an agent A0 starts a CPD interaction by choosing a
random neighbour A1. A0 and A1 then choose their coop-
eration levels depending on their individual strategies. The
agents then receive their payoffs and update their parameters,
most important of which is their opinion of each other. Post-
interaction opinion updates are discussed in detail in Sec-
tion 2.3.
2.2 Moral Interaction
In real life, ethical choices manifest in only a small propor-
tion of social interactions with higher stakes [Kidder, 2009].
While CPD interactions can incorporate opinion when agents
choose their cooperation levels, it does not provide a straight-
forward approach to model ethical decision-making.
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We thus introduce a new type of agent interaction called a
moral interaction. During an interaction, A0 opts for a moral
interaction over a CPD interaction with a probability , where
0 <   1, which captures the idea of moral interactions
only forming a small proportion of all interactions. A0 then
chooses a neighbourA1 for either donation or theft according
to A0’s strategy. A donation involves a transfer of d units of
resource from A0 to A1 and a theft involves a transfer of t
units of resource from A1 to A0. To model this as a high-
stakes interaction, we require d; t > T where T is the CPD
payoff described in Section 2.1. We note that unlike CPD,
A1 is only the target ofA0’s action and does not interact with
A0.
A moral interaction is followed by a broadcast where a
fraction  of the agents in A update their opinions ofA0. The
broadcast helps capture real-world phenomena where benef-
icent and maleficent actions are widely known compared to
commonplace interactions. The nature of the opinion updates
is discussed in detail in Section 2.3.
To summarise, an agent occasionally gets the opportunity
to either donate to or steal from one of its neighbours. When
this opening comes up, the choice of neighbour as well as the
decision to cheat or help is left up to the agent. Intuitively,
a more ethical agent would opt to help its neighbours rather
than cheat them.
2.3 Ethics
While moral interactions help model ethical decision making
as discussed in Section 2.2, post-interaction opinion updates
allow evaluation of the ethicality of agent actions. The up-
dates are based on two major schools of ethics: virtue ethics
and utilitarian ethics [van Roojen, 2001].
Virtue ethics emphasises the inherent moral nature of ac-
tions. In the context of our framework, higher cooperation
levels and acts of donation can be seen as inherently moral
actions. Utilitarian ethics, on the other hand, is a type of
consequentialist ethics where an act that increases the global
utility is considered to be ethical [Hursthouse and Pettigrove,
2018]. Since as discussed in Section 2, the resource parame-
ter is used as the prosperity of an agent, we define global util-
ity as the sum of the resource across all agents, i.e.,
P
x2A rx.
As discussed in Section 2, we interpret 	A0(A1) to beA0’s perception of A1’s ethicality. Thus, a moral evaluation
of A1 by A0 is modelled as a change in 	A0(A1).
We implement these ideas by using discrete opinion up-
dates based on a threshold. Formally, let s denotes the total
payoff after a CPD interaction between two agents A0 and
A1, with cooperation levels c0 and c1 respectively. We up-
date the opinion as shown in (3).
(3) consists of two parts, one based on virtue ethics and
the other based on utilitarian ethics. As discussed above,
a higher cooperation level is more ethical in the context of
virtue ethics. Thus, we increase 	Ab(A1 b) by !v when-
everA1 b’s cooperation level is above a threshold v and de-
crease it by the same value otherwise. Similarly, we increase
	Ab(A1 b) by !u if the total payoff s (change in global util-
ity) is above a threshold u and decrease by the same value
Parameter Description Value
 Donation game payoff parameter 5
 Donation game payoff parameter 2
 Probability of an agent receiving the oppor-
tunity to perform a moral interaction.
0.05
 Fraction of population that receives broadcast 0.8
d Resource donated in case of a donation action 20
t Resource stolen in case of a theft action 20
!d Change in opinion upon donation action 0.01
!t Change in opinion upon theft action 0.03
!v Change in opinion post CPD interaction
based on morality of action
0.004
!u Change in opinion post CPD interaction
based on utility of the interaction
0.002
v Threshold for morality based opinion update 0.5
u Threshold for utility based opinion update 0.0
Table 1: Summary of model parameters
otherwise.
	Ab(A1 b) :=
	Ab(A1 b) +
8>><>>:
!v + !u if c1 b > v ^ s > u
 !v + !u if c1 b  v ^ s > u
!v   !u if c1 b > v ^ s  u
 !v   !u otherwise
(3)
where: b 2 f0; 1g
We adopt a similar approach to update opinions after moral
interactions. However, the update is based only on virtue
ethics since a moral interaction does not change global utility.
If agent A0 opts for a moral interaction, an agent Aj updates
its opinion of A0 as described in (4) where Aj is either the
target of A0’s action (i.e. A1) or belongs to the fraction  of
the population which receives the broadcast.
	Aj (A0) := 	Aj (A0) +

!d if donation
 !t if theft (4)
We require !t > !d, i.e., the change in 	Aj (A0) to be
larger with theft than with donation, to model the notion that
“bad is stronger than good” [Baumeister et al., 2001]. (We
also call this condition as negativity bias, with the opposite
being positivity bias.) To model morality interactions as hav-
ing higher stakes, we require !t; !d  !v; !u.
In (3) and (4), 	Ab(A1 b) and 	Aj (A0) are clipped if
an update causes either of them to exceed the valid range of
[0; 1].
3 Virtue Agents
In this section we introduce a new agent type called a virtue
agent, which can be used to instantiate agents with differ-
ent levels of ethics. Our framework requires all agent types
to have the opinion and resource parameters. In addition to
these, virtue agents also have a parameter  for the agent’s
level of ethics, where 0    1. A distinguishing aspect of
the virtue agent type is that it uses the opinion of other agents
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in addition to its own level of ethics when performing an ac-
tion, i.e., it also incorporates the perceived ethicality of other
agents. This is similar to the approach of Spencer [Smith,
1982] which holds that that social perception is tied to moral-
ity. Agent parameters are summarised in Table 2.
3.1 CPD Interaction
As discussed in Section 2.1, when an agentA0 opts for a CPD
interaction, it chooses a random neighbour A1 with which
it interacts. Thus, a strategy for CPD interaction for Ab in-
volves outputting the cooperation level given A1 b, where
b 2 f0; 1g.
A virtue agentAb aggregates the opinion of the other agent
A1 b from its neighbours to output the cooperation level cb
as shown in (5).
wAb(x) = H1;1(	Ab(x))
cb =
P
x2N (Ab)nfA1 bg wAb(x) 	x(A1 b)P
x2N (Ab)nfA1 bg wAb(x)
(5)
where: H1;1 ! half-normal distribution obtained
from the N1;1 normal distribution
It is essentially a weighted mean of the neighbour’s opin-
ion about A1 b. Ab weights agent x’s opinion in proportion
to Ab’s perceived ethicality of x. We believe such an ag-
gregation models our society, where our opinion is shaped
by those around us, especially those who we hold in high
regard [Moussaı¨d et al., 2013; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al.,
2010].
Once cooperation levels are output by the individual agent
strategies, the payoffs are computed using the CPD matrix
and the resource parameter is updated for the interacting
agents followed by the opinion updates as discussed in Sec-
tion 2.
3.2 Moral Interaction
All agents get the opportunity to participate in a moral in-
teraction instead of a CPD interaction with probability  as
described in Section 2.2. The agent’s strategy for moral inter-
actions has two outputs: the action (either donation or theft),
and the neighbour on which the action is performed.
Intuitively, given the option between donation and theft,
an ethical agent opts for the former. The virtue agent type
models this idea by using the  parameter as the probability
of the agent to opt for donation over theft. Looking ahead,
using  as the probability gives a straightforward approach to
quantify ethics as a continuous value that is in turn useful for
analysing the results of simulations.
Once a virtue agent A0 has decided the action, the target
A1 is chosen according to (6). When A0 wishes to donate, it
chooses a relatively poor (low resource) neighbour of whom it
has a high opinion. Similarly, A0 steals from a relatively rich
(higher resource) neighbour of whom it has a low opinion.
vA0(x) =
	A0(x) + 1
rx + 1
A1 =
(
arg maxx2N (A0) vA0(x) if donation
arg minx2N (A0) vA0(x) if theft
(6)
Parameter Description Starting
value
id Unique identifier for every agent
N (A) Set of Moore neighbours of agent A in the
cellular automaton
rA Resource of agent A 100
	A(B) A’s opinion (between [0; 1]) about B 0.5
 Probability of virtue agent to opt for dona-
tion over theft
Table 2: Summary of agent parameters
It is known that higher social class is often correlated with
greater unethical behaviour [Piff et al., 2012], but we do not
consider this aspect. Our presumption of “stealing from the
rich” is based on research that indicates that criminals often
focus on targets that they consider more lucrative [Vandeviver
and Bernasco, 2019]. Likewise, the premise of “giving to the
poor” follows from the idea that people like to make gifts
which they believe will make a tangible difference, to targets
they like [Cryder and Loewenstein, 2011].
Once the action as well as the target agent A1 is output by
A0’s strategy, their resource is updated followed by a broad-
cast where a fraction  of A update their opinions of A0 as
discussed in Section 2.3.
4 Experiments and Results
Agents are placed on a toroidal grid on arbitrary cells such
that no two agents are on the same cell. We configure the pa-
rameters with the default values mentioned in Tables 1 and 2
unless explicitly specified otherwise. Each simulation con-
sists of 50 agents for a given value of the  parameter. We
discuss our findings from simulations in the following subsec-
tions. While we present plots for a single set of simulations,
the results have been verified across different parameters and
random seeds to ensure robustness.
The contribution of morality interactions towards ethical
decision making is highlighted by comparison with simula-
tions where  = 0, i.e., agents perform only CPD interac-
tions. We note that in such simulations, the level of ethics
parameter , is not used. We look at the range of agent re-
sources at the end of 1500 iterations. When agents perform
only CPD interactions, the difference in the maximum and
minimum resource value is around 500 compared to a differ-
ence of around 4000 when  = 0:05. This clearly shows that
the post CPD interaction opinion updates are not as large as
those of moral interaction. This reinforces our discussion in
Section 2.2 that moral interactions model high-stakes interac-
tions while forming a small fraction of all interactions.
4.1 Comparing Agent Resource Across Time
We analyse the effect of the level of ethics of an agent on
its resource across time by running simulations with an agent
pool comprising 250 virtue agents equally distributed among
5 levels of ethics,  2 f0:1; 0:3; 0:5; 0:7; 0:9g. We find that
unethical agents have higher resources initially but have sig-
nificantly lower resources in the long run as seen in Figures 1a
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Figure 1: Mean resource and reputation across time (!d = 0:02 & !t = 0:05)
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Figure 2: Mean resource and reputation at the end of 1500 iterations
and 1b. For clarity, the curves corresponding to only three
levels of ethics are shown in Figure 1a.
The gap between the reputations of ethical and unethical
agents increases with !d + !t since a theft action leads to a
loss of !t in the reputation whereas a donation action leads to
gain of !d. Thus, !d + !t is closely related to the extent to
which society favours ethical actions over unethical ones.
We observe that the time up to which unethical agents
remain relatively prosperous decreases with an increase in
!d +!t, as shown by Table 3, due to rapid divergence of rep-
utation between ethical and unethical agents which in turn af-
fects subsequent interactions. While the average resource in-
creases every iteration due to CPD interactions, we notice that
there is little change in average reputation for each group as
seen in Figure 1c, indicating that the simulation has achieved
stability. Thus, the difference between the prosperity of eth-
ical and unethical agents is likely to only increase with more
iterations.
These findings are in agreement with the conventional wis-
dom that unethical actions provide short-term payoffs but
leave one worse off in the long run.
4.2 Effect of Ethics on Resources in the Long Run
As discussed in Section 4.1, the rate of change of reputation
is small after a few hundred iterations. Thus, we can reason
about long-term trends by observing the state of the simula-
tion after the reputation has stabilised. In a simulation com-
prising 550 virtue agents equally distributed among 11 levels
of ethics,  2 f0:01; 0:1; 0:2; : : : ; 0:9; 0:99g, we observe that
!d !t Crossing Iteration
0.006 0.008 165
0.01 0.03 88
0.02 0.05 54
Table 3: Iteration after which ethical agents are prosperous
at the end of 1500 iterations the resource of an agent steeply
increases with its level of ethics as shown in Figure 2a. Fig-
ure 2b shows a similar trend where there is a steep increase in
reputation with the level of ethics.
The average reputation curve provides a possible explana-
tion for the observed relationship between the level of ethics
and average resource, since agents with higher reputations
also receive higher cooperation during CPD interactions and
are less likely to be chosen as targets for theft actions.
4.3 Bias in Society
As touched upon in Sections 2.3 and 4.1, !d and !t are key in
determining society’s perceptions of ethical and unethical ac-
tions. If !d < !t, an agent suffers a greater change (decrease)
in reputation due to an unethical action than that it would have
gained by performing an ethical action. We call such a config-
uration a negativity bias since unethical actions are penalised
more than ethical actions are rewarded. Similarly, the con-
figuration !d > !t is called a positivity bias and !d = !t
represents a lack of bias. Thus, in Figures 3a and 3b, curves
corresponding to (!d = 0:01, !t = 0:03) and (!d = 0:02,
!t = 0:05) represent negativity bias; (!d = 0:03, !t = 0:01)
and (!d = 0:05, !t = 0:02) represent positivity bias; and
(!d = 0:01, !t = 0:01) and (!d = 0:02, !t = 0:02) reflect
no bias.
To analyse the differences between a society with neg-
ativity bias, positivity bias and no bias, we run multiple
simulations with different values for !d and !t using 550
virtue agents equally distributed among 11 levels of ethics,
 2 f0:01; 0:1; 0:2; : : : ; 0:9; 0:99g. Figures 3a and 3b show
the average resource and reputation plotted against the level
of ethics after 1500 iterations for each simulation. As ex-
pected, agents with higher levels of ethics have higher reputa-
tions and resource in the long run as discussed in Section 4.2.
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Figure 3: Mean resource and reputation in societies with different bias
Moreover, among simulations having the same bias, the dif-
ferences in resources and reputations increase with !d + !t
as discussed in Section 4.1.
We now turn our attention towards the nature of the curves,
especially the rate of change of resource and reputation. From
Figures 3a and 3b, we observe that when there is no bias, the
rate of change is almost symmetric with respect to the level of
ethics; low at the extremes and high around the middle. Neg-
ativity bias on the other hand leads to a high rate of change in
the high-ethics range and a significantly lower rate of change
in the low-ethics range. The opposite is true in case of posi-
tivity bias where there are minor differences in resources and
reputations of high-ethics agents and significant differences
in case of low-ethics agents.
We find that a society with negativity bias might lead to
divergent trends where unethical agents become more uneth-
ical for short-term gains while ethical agents have the incen-
tive to be more ethical to increase their reputation as well
as resources. This is supported by our previous observation
of small rates of change in reputation for unethical agents
becoming more unethical but a rapid increase in reputation
when ethical agents become more ethical.
Similarly, a society with positivity bias might lead to con-
vergent trends. Here, unethical agents have the incentive of
a rapidly increasing reputation as well as resource to become
more ethical while there is negligible change in the resource
and reputation of ethical agents (e.g., agents having a level
of ethics greater than 0.4 in Figure 3b) which might lead to
such agents becoming more unethical as long as it does not
harm their reputation. A similar analysis shows that societies
without bias do not provide any strong incentive for people to
change their level of ethics.
4.4 Global Utility and Agent Composition
While Sections 4.1 to 4.3 discuss agent resource and reputa-
tion, we now turn our attention to global utility, defined as
the sum of resources of all agents as discussed in Section 2.3.
Global utility quantifies how prosperous the society is as a
whole. We look at the relationships between global utility
and the number and level of ethical agents. There are two
sets of six simulations apiece, each with 100 virtue agents.
One set of simulations has 90 virtue agents with 0.2 level of
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Figure 4: Global utility and level of ethics of agents in a skewed
population
ethics, and the other has 90 virtue agents with 0.1 level of
ethics. The remaining 10 virtue agents have an identical level
of ethics chosen from  2 f0:4; 0:5; : : : ; 0:9g across simula-
tions. Figure 4 shows a plot of the global utility against the
level of ethics of the 10 ethical agents at the end of 1500 iter-
ations.
We find that the global utility steeply rises with the level
of ethics of the ethical agents. Thus, in a society with a large
proportion of unethical agents, even a small population of eth-
ical agents leads to a significant increase in the global utility.
The higher the ethics of the ethical agents, the greater is the
global utility.
4.5 Ethics of Different Agent Strategies
The simulations discussed previously comprised of only
virtue agents. Since the framework discussed in Section 2
is independent of the agent type, we turn to evaluating the
ethicality of existing strategies like Tit-For-Tat [Axelrod and
Hamilton, 1981], Suspicious-Tit-For-Tat [Boyd and Lorber-
baum, 1987], Grim Trigger [Friedman, 1971] and random
agents (choose a random cooperation level). These strategies
have to be extended to output a target and action for morality
interactions to be compatible with our framework. We do so
by outputting a random neighbour as target and use the orig-
inal IPD strategy for donation and theft where a donation ac-
tion is interpreted as cooperate, and theft action is interpreted
as defect with respect to the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma.
We run a simulation comprising 250 virtue agents equally
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Figure 5: Comparison of existing CPD strategies
distributed among 5 levels of ethics  2 f0:1; 0:3; : : : ; 0:9g
and 50 agents each for the four alternative agent types men-
tioned above. The results are summarised in Figures 5a
and 5b.
Intuitively, a TFT agent is expected to be more ethical than
a STFT agent since the former continues to cooperate (virtu-
ous) with the other agent until the other agent defects. We see
that the simulations reinforce our intuition since TFT agents
have a high reputation on average while STFT agents have a
low reputation on average.
5 Conclusion
Ethics in society and in AI systems are of great contempo-
rary interest, but the use of AI-based techniques to under-
stand ethics in society has not hitherto been given its due.
The framework we use allows for ethics to be added to agent-
based models of social phenomena. The novel virtue agent
type has specifically been used here to analyse the relation-
ship between ethics, prosperity and society. However, the
virtue agent can also serve as a foundation to design ethical
agent behaviours in other settings and problems.
Previous studies from psychology [Rand and Nowak,
2011] as well as game theory [Dreber et al., 2008; Wu
et al., 2009] have shown that rewards are more effective
than punishments at securing cooperation. Our society how-
ever emphasises penalising unethical behaviour through law-
enforcement and other punitive actions, rather than reward-
ing ethical behaviour [Galak and Chow, 2019]. This is in
part on account of the prevalent doctrine of retributive jus-
tice [Walen, 2016] which sees wrongdoing as needing explicit
correction through punishment, but says little about reward-
ing good deeds. Our results suggest that the latter may pro-
vide a stronger incentive for people to be ethical. We also see
that larger rewards for ethical actions significantly diminish
the transient advantages of unethical actions, and may thus
help improve ethics in society.
A natural extension to the virtue agent type are agents that
update their levels of ethics based on past interactions. Strate-
gies based on optimising resources, like reinforcement learn-
ing, are particularly interesting directions for future work.
Analyses of such simulations can provide deeper insights.
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